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*Alexander Afanasiev***HUMANITARIAN KNOWLEDGE AND TRENDS
IN ITS EVOLUTION**

Еволюція гуманітарного знання виявляє дві тенденції. Перша демонструє схожість гуманітарного і природничонаукового, наявність однакових методів пізнання і експлікації знання та загальнонаукових ідеалів. Друга тенденція відзначає істотну відмінність гуманітарного знання, його специфічні концептуальні установки і засоби пізнання та подання знань. Обґрунтованість і протилежність обох концепцій дозволяє припустити їх додатковість.

Ключові слова: гуманітарні науки, природознавство, ідеали науки, нарративність, номологічні пояснення, принцип додатковості.

Эволюция гуманитарного знания выявляет две тенденции. Первая демонстрирует сходство гуманитарного и естественнонаучного, наличие одинаковых методов познания и экспликации знания и общенаучных идеалов. Вторая тенденция отмечает существенное отличие гуманитарного знания, его специфические концептуальные установки и средства познания и представления знаний. Обоснованность и противоположность обеих концепций позволяет предположить их дополнительность.

Ключевые слова: гуманитарные науки, естествознание, идеалы науки, нарративность, номологическое объяснение, принцип дополнительности.

The article reveals two trends in the development of the human knowledge. The first shows similarities between the humanities and natural science, usage of the same methods of learning and explication of knowledge and general scientific ideals. The second trend points to the significant difference between the humanities and natural sciences from its specific conceptual installations and means of knowledge and knowledge representation. Validity and opposition of both conceptions allow to suppose their complementarity.

Keywords: science of humanities, human knowledge, natural sciences, the ideals of science, narrative, nomological explanation, principle of subsidiarity.

Prerequisites for the allocation of human knowledge in a special kind of knowledge are formed already in antiquity. There humanitarianism was associated with education, delicate taste, good breeding, as well as the warmth, friendliness, humanity. In the Renaissance there is the idea that a man is a special type of existence. His spiritual world becomes an independent object

of cognition. This was the beginning of the formation of a special sphere of human knowledge.

The question of scientific nature of a definite system of knowledge was determined not only by the paradigmatic status of classical mechanics in Modern Age. The ideal of scientific nature defined by Kant had a considerable importance. This ideal, on the one hand, defined mathematics and science as a universal form of scientific knowledge by setting a sample of scientism. But, on the other hand, thereby laid the tradition within which many humanities and their particular methodology could not find scientific status. Hegelian and Marxist paradigms on a single scientific ideal that developed this side of the Kantian heritage, forced to ignore many of the features of social and humanitarian problems. Humanitarian knowledge acquired the status of a science only when overcame individual, single, empiric threshold, and the subject of cognition and activity was ascended to transcendent and absolute level. In fairness it should be noted that the desire to comply with this highest manifestation of scientificity contributed to the development of many social discipline and humanities.

An unified ideal of scientificity soon raised some doubts. That was influenced by Kant's ideas about the other two spheres of life, two worlds where there was a man: the natural world and out of natural human world. But if for Marx that meant only the specificity of social laws different from natural, but not substantive or methodological opposition, at the same time for a number of other areas of post-Kantian and post-Hegelian philosophy an idea about the fundamental difference between nature and culture, nature and society, was formed. Hence it was close to the idea of the difference and opposition of humanities and natural sciences and their methods.

An essential prerequisite and ideological background of these philosophical reflections was a literary activity of primarily German, but also English, French, Russian, and other writers, known as the Romantics and representatives of broader cultural schools of romanticism. In their image a literary and everyday character, as a man of strong passions and lofty aspirations, became a romantic. Therefore, fiction and exotica, vivid pictures of nature and life, actions and thoughts, unusual manifestations of national identity, became attractive both for writers and artists, on the one side, and scientists, on the other side. Hence the interest in folklore, remaking of folklore works, creation of individual works based on folk art. The historical novels, fictional tales, ballads that used ambiguity of words, figures of speech of all sorts, as well as innovations in the field metric, rhythmic and even poetry, appeared. All this could not affect the philosophical investigations, which topics and problem field significantly expands.

Gradually, the discussions about the relationship between the humanities and the natural sciences and, consequently, the nature of study humanities, appeared. With all the variety of nominated points of view, they can be reduced to two basic positions, discover their validity and opposition, which is the purpose of this article.

One of the first people who questioned the abstract ideal of natural sciences, was G. Herder, who drew attention to the following phenomena as the people, the era and the culture. F. Schleiermacher, paying tribute to the Entire and the Eternal, also tried to draw attention to the historical reality. He believed that philosophy should study not only theoretical reason and scientific thinking but ordinary daily life. By studying everyday life, knowledge inevitably turn away from looking for the general laws to the discovery of singular and individual. That is already far from the Kantian formulation of the problem: scientific knowledge should focus on the individual. Accordingly, natural science and mathematics, as well as all "natural science", lose their exemplary status and are pushed aside by "sciences of spirit". For us it is not so important that the developers of the topic did not come to the unity relative to the psychological, cultural, or historical value bases of the human sciences. Much more important that their specificity has been fixed. W. Dilthey even distinguished between the natural sciences and the human sciences on three grounds: on the subject of knowledge, the material, and their methods. "The human sciences should be based on the most common concepts of the doctrine of the method and testing them on their special objects to reach certain techniques and principles in their field, in exactly the same way as it the natural sciences. Not that we will be true disciples of the great thinkers of natural science that we will transfer their methods to our area, but with the fact that our knowledge will apply to the nature of our subject and that we in relation to it will act as they do in relation to theirs" [5, p.15-16].

The first attempt to fix the methodological specificity of humanities was undertook by J.G. Droysen [6; 7]. In 1858, in his book "Grundriss der Historie" Droysen introduced a methodological dichotomy into scientific use: explanation and understanding. Originally it was just his own distinction of philosophical method intended to learn something, physical method, that performed functions of an explanation, and historical methods necessary for understanding. Explanation, as it was understood by Droysen, is realized in laws of natural sciences and is their goal. Understanding is implemented in the metaphysical judgments of the humanities and is their purpose. In the concept of Dilthey the trichotomy transformed into the dichotomy of explanation and understanding, and like this became the subject of analysis in the philosophical literature.

In the works of F. Schleiermacher, I. Droysen, W. Dilthey, G. Simmel, etc. there is a fairly well-developed concept of specificity of the human sciences, as the sciences of spirit, that is of the spiritual life, of the world of experience and relevant cultural and historical constructions. By their efforts the idea of methodological monism was denied, the evidence of insufficiency of the transfer of natural ideals and approaches to the humanitarian sphere was provided, the independence of the special spiritual reality that eludes science was approved. The distinctive features of this trend became the psychologism in the ontological justification of the subject of the humanities, intuitionism, accustomisation, understanding in the methodology of human knowledge, antipositivism in gnoseology and epistemology. Their critics saw this hefty raid of irrationality on the humanities, that was incompatible with the ideals of scientific nature. But the fact of the philosophical analysis of the humanitarian sphere and its rational and irrational phenomena indicates the attempts to identify some rational grounds of the humanistic and the desire to push aside the irrational aspects and to narrow the scope of irrational.

In this sense, the revival of Kant's ideas about the constructive role of the mind, in particular by the neo-Kantians, was of great importance, and the slogan "back to Kant" actually meant "moving forward" to the expansion of the sphere of rational. The same applies to the Margburg school, where knowledge meant rational construction of the object, and the Baden school, where science was understood as a transition from irrational reality to rational concepts. Even an individualizing method, that eliminated the formulation of the general laws of history, meant more likely an invasion of rational to the irrational, rather than vice versa. In other words, the search for the specificity of the human sciences did not mean the widespread rejection of scientific ideals.

Supporters of a unified methodology usually focus on opposition of the humanities to natural methods made by G. Rickert. "I - claims Rickert - oppose an individualizing method of history to the generalizing method of natural science" [8, p.75]. It is made a final on this place and because of that the position of the philosopher greatly distorted. Meanwhile, and this is important to note, Rickert, by distinguishing the methods human and natural areas, did not make a rigid distinction of subject areas, thereby allowing the use of methods in different subject areas. "Of course, the scientific method is also applicable in the field of culture, and in no case one should claim that there are only historical sciences of culture. Conversely, it is possible to some extent, to talk about the historical method in the natural sciences" [8, p.54].

Unlike G. Rickert, W. Windelband distinguishes science from the humanities, in particular, from history, not by the subject or method, but for the purposes of research, which, however, are responsible for the methods that

are used. Thus, he abandons the division of knowledge into the natural sciences and the human sciences. The principle of the division he follows is "the formal character of cognitive goals of sciences." Some researches seek out the general laws of science, others - some facts and events, such as history. Natural science finds out what is always the case, and history records that it was only once. This gives a rise to different types of thinking: nomothetic (from greek. nomos - law) and idiographic (describing special) [3, p. 319-320].

The attempts to identify the characteristics of the human knowledge do not stop and in the XX century, in particular, in relation to the development of problems of interpretation. G. Gadamer showed that the starting position for the interpretation of the thing of the boundless, defy rational basis for the reconstruction of the original pre-theoretical understanding of the world, rooted in tradition, language, community of life. Not the natural science but namely the humanitarian sphere: literature, art, moral, historical stories, teaching of life, is much closer to this initial storage of understanding. It is important to emphasize that if the humanities often stumbles over the islands of irrational in its subject, that does not mean the restriction of the scope of rational, but rather attempts to their rational "setting." J. Habermas emphasizes that interpreters are forced to comply with the standards of rationality, so any interpretation is a rational and a reliable interpretation is achieved only when the rational reconstruction of the environment in which interpreted statement claims the importance [10, p. 51].

The diverse critics of standards of scientific nature, especially common in the humanitarian sphere, has become very popular in the late XX and early XXI century. It has an orientation seemingly devastating for science, but reveals a number of positive aspects, in particular, contributes to the further development and refinement of scientific criteria. In addition, some of the ideas of post-structuralism and postmodernism, mostly literary plan (R. Barthes, R. Jakobson, Zh. Zhenett, as well as M. Foucault and J. Derrida), in particular regarding the "death of the subject" and "death of the author" and their criticism of standards of rationality can be used in a constructive way. Moreover, it is not necessarily contradicts to their fundamental settings. For example, if the "death of the subject" (M. Foucault) or "death of the author" (R. Barthes) subsumes the copyright text in countless readers' interpretations or dissolving it in an infinite number of previous ideas and direct quotations from the predecessors, nothing prevents the use of any ideas of Barthes, Foucault, Derrida etc., in the sense that suits the researcher [2, p.16].

The supporters of a unified methodology of science tried to prove the scientific nature of the humanities with presence of the common features of science with natural sciences, in particular, an explanation. The result was the

model of the embraced law in history as part of a theory of explanations [4, p. 16-31]. However, this model has caused serious criticism, particularly concerning the inconsistency of the practice of historical research where historians are not concerned with the search for an explanation of the general laws [1, p.496]. At the same time it became clear that the explanatory function can perform linguistic structure of the corresponding text, which sets out the results of the study, and the text as a whole. This is well illustrated by the Marxist explanations, which were quite consistent with nomological scheme and were very convincing, though only within the Marxist discourse.

The study of linguistic structures of scientific texts have shed additional light on the real and engineered structures, including laws, patterns, trends, law-like rules in type of biblical commandments, performing the role of laws. An appeal to them is akin to explanatory function. So, K. Hübner believes that strict deductive explanation and narrative are two different forms of explanation, and one may be transferred to another [11, p.243-244]. A. Danto showed that the structure of historical explanation and narrative structure offers the same and there is clearly visible analogy with deductive explanation [11, p.248]. Thus, many researchers found in the human theories some special structures that are important for scientific explanations, predictions, retrolegends, descriptions, and other functions of a scientific theory, similar to that of natural science theories.

At the same time, other authors see in the narrative nature and other specific narrative structures, included in the descriptive and explanatory procedures, the fatal specifics of humanities, fundamentally different from nomological explanations. J. F Lyotard even proposes to replace the explanatory theory of narrative. The adepts of this view point to the presence of narrative structures not only in literature, but in many, if not all, scientific theories, which are sometimes interpreted as a manifestation of narrative rationality and studied as a narrative turn in epistemology. H. White, in his "Metahistory" emphasizes the inadequacy of scientific "nomologically-deductive" paradigm as an instrument of historical explanation [9, p.9]. Indeed, narrativity often looks like the opposite to nomological forms, especially if emphasis is placed on the narrative or other nonnomological structures of theory.

Thus, even a brief history of philosophical understanding of the humanities reveals two trends. The first trend is focused on the fact that the humanities at least in some aspects have to be very similar to natural sciences and to use the same methods and means of knowledge and explication of knowledge. The second trend underlined another feature: the human knowledge is significantly different from the natural sciences and uses specific conceptual installations and means of knowledge and knowledge representation. Moreover, the

specificity was seen in the signs that were seemingly incompatible: from irrationality to specific standards of rationality of the humanities. These trends appear to sometimes struggling "to the bitter end," though only one of them is correct. Meanwhile, each of them has a lot of convincing arguments in its favor, and none of them do not have sufficient arguments against the other. In many ways, they are mutually exclusive. But ignoring any of them significantly depletes the human knowledge.

Therefore, a more appropriate assumption is formulated in the form of output, of their additionality (complementarity) in the spirit of methodological ideas of N. Bohr, possibly with the predominance of strict scientific approach that extends the general scientific field of the humanities. In practical terms, this would mean hopelessness of the opposition of the humanities and natural sciences, and the expediency of the search not only the differences, but the unity of the human and natural knowledge.

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